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The (mis) 
interpretation of 
Section 25 of the 
Fire and Rescue 
Services Act 2004
Professor Pete Murphy and 
Research Associate Katarzyna 
Lakoma, Nottingham Trent 
University, look at the government’s 
approach to reporting on fire 
services compliance with the 
National Frameworks
“There is no mention of Covid-19 nor the Tripartite 
Agreement signed in March that allowed firefighters to 
drive ambulances, deliver vital supplies to the elderly and 
vulnerable, and move the bodies of the deceased”
I
mmediately before Parliament adjourned for its 
summer recess on July 22, the Home Secretary issued 
the regular bi-annual report on the extent to which 
fire authorities have been acting in accordance with 
the National Framework. 
This is a statutory requirement of the Fire and Rescue 
Services Act 2004 and should include any formal steps 
the government has taken to secure compliance with the 
framework. When introducing the original Bill, the duty 
to keep the framework up to date and report on it was 
considered ‘fundamental to ensuring the effective national 
provision of safety through the Fire Service’.  
Submitting the report in July, shortly before the 
recess, has become the government’s regular practice, as 
unfortunately has the lack of any public or parliamentary 
debate. This appears to be synonymous with the 
government’s recent ‘minimalist’ approach to reporting on 
the Service adopted since Eric Pickles became Secretary of 
State in 2010. Looking back at previous reports, particularly 
those submitted during the Coalition Government, makes 
the latest reports covering two full sides of A4 subdivided 
into three sections, relatively substantial in comparison to 
their immediate predecessors. 
This prompted us to have a look at what has been 
reported, and, possibly more interestingly, what could have 
been reported but has been left out.  
It seems the 2016 report that followed the NAO and 
Public Accounts Committee reports in 2015 and 2016 was 
a bit of a watershed, but we will come to that later.
The latest (2020) report contains a section on the 
services’ compliance with the 2018 National Framework, 
a section on the first cycle of inspections and State of Fire 
report from HMICFRS, and a final section on Grenfell 
Tower. Like it’s immediate predecessor in 2018 (but 
unlike most reports since 2010), it mentions issues or 
initiatives that have arisen or intensified between the end 
of the formal reporting period (March 31, 2020) and the 
preparation of the report itself in July. However, it omits 
any mention of the current Covid-19 pandemic or the 
services’ response to it.   
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Compliance 
The latest report assured parliament that every authority 
had complied with the requirement to publish an annual 
statement of assurance. Having examined a sample of these 
to see what they said on ‘Integrated Risk Management 
Plans and financial plans’, the Secretary of State was 
satisfied that every fire and rescue authority in England has 
acted in accordance with the requirements of the National 
Framework, and no formal steps have been taken by the 
Secretary of State since the last assurance statement in 
2018 to secure compliance. 
This is interesting in three ways. 
First, it places a heavy reliance on statements of 
assurance and adopts a very generous interpretation about 
their veracity. This contrast with the findings from NTU’s 
evaluation of all statements of assurance (Spencer et al 
2019) that found the guidance on preparing statements 
to be too broad and open to interpretation to be fit for 
purpose. It also found that whilst most authorities provided 
some form of report on their website, significant variations 
in terms of their length, structure, and content limited their 
value. At the time of our survey, 30 per cent of authorities 
did not have an up to date statement available online. 
The statement of assurance was introduced with the 2012 
National Framework, and there were no changes to the 
requirements or guidance within the 2018 Framework.  
Second, it omits any mention of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
FBU evidence to the recent Home Affairs Select Committee 
claimed that fire and rescue services had not been given 
guidance by the government on reacting to a pandemic for 
12 years before the Covid-19 outbreak. In addition, their 
recent assessment of the current IRMPs, drawn up by 50 
local fire services, shows that 60 per cent of services did not 
mention ‘pandemic’ or ‘flu’, and none provided detailed 
plans on how to deal with potential risk of pandemic in 
their IRMPs (FBU, 2020). This suggests failure to comply 
with the requirements on IRMPs, which need to ‘reflect 
up to date risk analyses including an assessment of all 
foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect 
the area of the authority’ (Home Office, 2018).
Third, there is no mention of the Home Secretary’s 
approval to transfer the governance of seven fire and rescue 
authorities to police, fire and crime commissioners having 
been satisfied that a local case has been for them to do so 
“in the interests of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, 
or public safety.” 
Inspection
The report does include some of the outcomes from 
the first round of HMICFRS inspections and the Chief 
Inspector’s State of Fire report from which it briefly 
highlights evidence of strengths as well as areas of 
“There is still a need for Section 25 reports as part of the parliamentary 
assurance arrangements, the Home Office should be making them 
complementary to the State of Fire report, more comprehensive in their 
coverage and more consistent in their content”
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concern. It also states that ‘the Home Office will keep 
under review the need for section 25 assurance reports 
in addition to those reports now produced by HMICFRS’, 
a statement that echoes a similar comment in the 2018 
report. It does not, however, mention that the inspections 
and the reports were about individual services and did 
not include inspection of the governance arrangements 
or the full range of authority’s responsibilities. Section 25 
and the earlier Section 21, which establishes the National 
Frameworks, are directed explicitly at fire and rescue 
authorities, not fire and rescue services or the range of 
services covered in HMICFRS inspection framework. 
The 2018 report was also interesting in terms 
of inspection. It chose to highlight the best value 
inspections into Avon FRS in 2017 (Baker, 2017) and 
Northamptonshire FRS in 2018, although the 2016 report 
did not mention the independent review in Essex FRS in 
2015 (Lucas, 2015). 
In relation to Avon, the inspection considered the 
authority’s compliance with its ‘best value duty’ under 
Section 3 of the 1999 Act which required the authority to 
make arrangements to secure continuous improvement 
in the way in which its functions are exercised, having 
regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. The Section 25 report states that in the lead 
inspector’s opinion, the authority was failing to comply 
with its duty under Section 3 of the 1999 Act and made 
a number of proposals for improvement in the areas of 
governance, leadership, culture and external scrutiny. 
However, rather confusingly, the Section 25 report states 
that the lead inspector found that the authority had met 
its obligations with reference to the National Framework. 
The inspector’s report states ‘in other ways the authority 
has met its obligations with reference to the National 
Framework such as with regard to assurance statements, 
Freedom of Information requests and publication of data’. 
This was after criticising the IRMP and stating that some 
important decisions were not transparent, and that the 
authority were failing to uphold the Nolan principles 
of public life. 
In relation to Northamptonshire, the failure to comply 
with best value was due to a lack of budgetary control and 
an organisational culture that discouraged scrutiny. The 
Home Office subsequently asked the Chair of the NFCC 
to review Northamptonshire’s operational viability and he 
concluded that while it was under considerable stress – 
financially and operationally – it was fulfilling its statuary 
duty to comply with the National Framework, which may 
be taken by some as a further damming indictment of the 
inadequacy of the 2012 framework. Northamptonshire 
FRS has one of the seven PFCCs referred to above as 
Stephen Mold took over on January 1, 2019. 
Grenfell Tower
The third section of the 2020 report refers to Grenfell 
Tower and the publication on October 30, 2019 of 
Sir Martin Moore-Bick’s Phase 1 report covering the 
events on the night of the fire, including the role of 
the emergency services. Sir Martin made a number of 
recommendations for central government, which were 
all accepted in principle by the government. The report 
accepted that there was more to do but quoted progress 
in four areas:
• The introduction of the Fire Safety Bill to parliament 
clarifying the scope of the Fire Safety Order 
• The new Fire Protection Board chaired by the National 
Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) and supported by £10m of 
funding for protection work 
• Working with London Fire Brigade and NFCC on 
implementation of the recommended operational 
changes 
• The receipt of an additional £20m to enable services to 
increase fire inspection and enforcement capability.
 
While this innovation is clearly welcome, it does prompt 
the question as to why was there no mention of Dame 
Judith Hackitt’s interim or final reports on the Building 
Regulations and fire safety or the Kerslake Report (2017) 
into the preparedness and response to the Manchester 
Arena attack? Neither is mentioned in 2020, despite the 
2018 report stating that the Hackitt Review (and Grenfell) 
‘which was reporting on against the 2012 Framework may 
make recommendations which need to be reflected in 
further revisions to the National Framework’.
More surprisingly, in a report published in July 
2020, there is no mention of Covid-19 nor the Tripartite 
Agreement signed in March that allowed firefighters to 
drive ambulances, deliver vital supplies to the elderly and 
vulnerable, and move the bodies of the deceased. The 
agreement and the activities covered have since been 
extended twice and now run to  September 30. The NFCC 
website shows the range of activities undertaken to date 
but also a range of additional activities being discussed, as 
the impact of the pandemic extends further into the future 
and responses to it diversify.
A Watershed
The 2016 report was the first of the (slightly) longer reports 
that have been published since 2010. It still only relates 
to compliance issues, but it does explain the heightened 
interest in Statements of Assurance, which were 
introduced with the 2012 National Framework. As the 
reports explains, the Public Accounts Committee report 
on the Financial Sustainability of Fire and Rescue Service 
had been published and ‘the Home Office agreed to 
“The Section 25 reports should also contain a review of the 
implications of major incidents such as man-made and 
natural disasters and any issues for or changes needed to the 
National Framework of national guidance” 
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continue to check [sic] that all fire and rescue authorities 
in England have published assurance statements to 
confirm that they have complied with the requirements 
of the Framework. In addition, the Home Office agreed 
to conduct a rigorous examination of a random sample 
of fire and rescue authority assurance statements to 
seek evidence that authorities have complied with 
the Framework’.
Following this review and follow up clarifications, 
the Home Secretary was satisfied that all were compliant 
but produced a string of areas where practice could be 
strengthened: ‘These include consistency of approach 
on how fire and rescue authorities present their 
evidence and the information in support their Assurance 
Statement; sign off by the Chair of the fire and rescue 
authority; the timing of revisions to integrated risk 
management plans; the provision of more information 
on how National Resilience requirements were being 
met; and the value of highlighting examples that could 
constitute best practice on assurance statements such 
as including a table of the requirements of the National 
Framework with references to evidence showing how 
each requirement was met’.
The accompanying assurance that the Home 
Office would liaise with authorities to explore where 
further guidance would be valuable came to nothing 
and the guidance remained unchanged by the 2018 
National Framework. The Home Office agreement 
to continue to check was a bit disingenuous as the 
Home Office first wrote to authorities in April 2016, 
which was outside of the reporting period for the 2016 
report. In previous years, it had been the Department 
of Communities and Local Government’s (DCLGs) 
responsibility.
2012 and 2014 
These ‘reports’ were little 
more than statements that the 
Secretary of State was satisfied 
that fire and rescue services 
had been acting in accordance 
with the framework, although 
the NAO and PAC were later 
to dispute how the DCLG 
could give such an assurance 
given the inadequacy of their 
sponsorship and monitoring 
arrangements. The 2012 report 
mentions the forthcoming 2012 
National Framework but would 
have been reporting against 
the 2008-2011 Framework. 
The 2014 report does report 
against the lamentable 
2012 Framework but merely 
confirmed that fire and rescue 
authorities had all published 
annual statements of 
assurance and updated IRMPs 
and complied with national 
resilience assurance elements. 
There is no mention of Sir 
Ken Knight’s Review of efficiencies and operations 
undertaken for the department in 2013.
Throughout the 2010-2020 period there have been 
various man-made and natural disasters that have 
challenged the capacity and capability of fire and rescue 
services and changed the risk profile they are facing at 
national, regional and local levels. Natural disasters have 
included widespread flooding, storms, wildfires and other 
adverse and extreme weather incidents caused by climate 
change. The man-made disasters in addition to Grenfell 
and the Manchester Arena attack have included major 
train crashes in Plymouth and Suffolk as well as increasing 
terrorist incidents and in 2019 there was a significant rise 
in fatal motorway accidents as a result of so-called “smart” 
motorways. In fact, both man-made and natural disasters 
have increased in numbers and severity throughout the 
last ten years, but successive Section 25 reports have not 
mentioned any of them. 
Now that HMICFRS are producing annual State of Fire 
reports rather than considering whether there is still a 
need for Section 25 reports as part of the parliamentary 
assurance arrangements, the Home Office should 
be making them complementary to the State of Fire 
report, more comprehensive in their coverage and 
more consistent in their content. The Section 25 reports 
should also contain a review of the implications of major 
incidents such as man-made and natural disasters and any 
issues for or changes needed to the National Framework of 
national guidance. 
It is generally established that there has been wide 
variations in Covid-19 support required both across 
England and between the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Local lockdowns, 
a potential second wave and increasingly diverse 
responses to Covid-19 are likely to require a bigger, 
more agile and a more bespoke response from all the 
emergency services.    
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